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HARRY D. Nizms*
In the last 25 years changes, almost basic in their character, have
occurred in our courts. One of these has been the gradual emergence of
what is known as "pre-trial." No legislation has been necessary for its de-
velopment. It is a dramatic illustration of the inherent power of the courts
to improve their service to the public.
Contrasted with the time that has usually elapsed between important
improvements in common law procedure, the time required for pre-trial
to win a definite place for itself has been remarkably brief.
Also, in contrast with former changes of this sort, most of which
have been decidedly mysterious to laymen, pre-trial can be understood by
almost anyone. It consists of informal discussions of cases with a judge
before they go to trial. Surely this involves no mystery.
There is nothing new about such discussions. Courts have used
them for years in a limited way. They were first employed systematically
in America about 1929 by the Circuit Court of Michigan (Detroit)
under the leadership of Chief Justice Ira W. Jayne; and they speedily
became what Professor Edson R. Sunderland, our greatest authority on
procedure, has described as "potentially the most effective instrument for
shortening, simplifying and cheapening civil litigations that ever has been
devised."
Just when, how and where the term "pre-trial" was first used seems
doubtful. It probably appeared about 1929 or 1930 as the name of these
conferences. In any event, it soon caught public fancy; and newspapers
and others now use it to refer to almost anything that happens in a lawsuit
prior to the trial.
At the outset, the conferences were employed to encourage the
simplification of litigation by agreements as to the facts and as to the
evidence to be submitted at the trial. This has been of immense service
to the public. Before very long, however, valuable by-products emerged.
The conferences revealed the merit or lack of merit of the conten-
tions of each side and to an increasing degree, in the conferences, the
parties decided not to go further with the litigation but to settle it then
and there.
Traditionally the courts have emphasized trials and devoted most of
their efforts, resources and personnel to them and paid little attention to
pending cases and what they might mean to the parties involved. It was
generally believed that the only method available to a court to dispose of
cases on its dockets was to try them. But today, to an increasing extent
they are helping litigants dispose of their controversies while their cases
are waiting to be tried.
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This has brought public approval, because for a long time court
trials, with the delay, bother and expense involved, have 'had little to
recommend them. People continue to go to the courts for help, but in-
creasingly they seem to avoid trials.
There are good reasons for this. The public believes that trials are
unnecessarily costly in time and money. Also, it disapproves vigorously of
various methods used in trials, as, for instance, the rules which a hostile
lawyer can and does use to prevent a witness, who obviously is honest and
has knowledge of the situation involved, from testifying regarding it or
from telling his story in a natural way.
Again, many people believe that trials are unnecessarily costly not
only in money and time but in unnecessary attendance in court. Constantly,
for years those called on jury panels have been disheartened by what they
have seen and experienced in court. It is an understatement to say that
trials are not popular or approved today by the average person who has
had experience with them. All this could not fail to influence the work
and operation of the courts and they have done just that.
One result seems to be a gradual but quite definite decrease in recent
years in the percentage of the cases disposed of by the courts which are
ended by a trial. In some courts, today, that figure is as low as 5%.
For instance, in the Supreme (Superior) Court of New York (New
York and Bronx Counties) in 1942, of the jury cases disposed of, 31%
were tried; in 1950, 15% were tried; in 1952, 10%; in 1956, about
5%-a falling off in fourteen years of about 84% in the ratio of cases
ended by trial to the total number of cases disposed of.
In the Massachusetts Court in 1924, the percentage was 21%; in
1934, it was 13%; in 1944, itwas 14%; in 1955, it was 11%-a similar
falling off of some 47% in 31 years.
Presiding Judge Jayne of the Circuit Court of Michigan in Detroit
reports as of April 1956, that more than 80% of the civil cases in his
court are settled and that four of the eighteen judges of the court spend
full time in pre-trial.
The limited use of trials is shown in the 1956 report of the New
York Judicial Conference.' In the court year 1955-1956, one hundred
and six trial judges of the Supreme (Superior) Court2 tried to completion
1896 jury cases and 1641 non-jury cases3 , a total of about 6% of the
cases disposed of.
An additional 2879" were ended during trial by dismissal or dis-
continuance, out of a total disposition of 52,328 cases, so that all dis-
positions in a trial courtroom were about 12% of the total dispositions.
No positive deductions should be drawn from the limited data we
1 STATE OF NEW YORK JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, First Annual Report, (1956).
2 Id at 17.
3 Id at 60.
4 Id at 64.
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now have on these conditions but enough does exist to raise a very serious
question as to the extent of the future usefulness of the trial process as
a major agency for the disposition of court business.
Furthermore, some efforts are being made to limit the use of trials
because they are uneconomical from the taxpayer's standpoint.
It seems clear that most civil cases in Superior Courts are disposed
of for less than $1,000. This means that for the court, the taxpayer, the
litigant and the lawyer, trials often are wasteful procedures, for in most
instances the true cost of the trial exceeds the amount recovered. Taxpayers
spend from $300.00 to $800.00 per day to operate a jury courtroom in
a Superior Court and, in addition, litigants pay the lawyers involved. This
is not a very efficient, practical or sensible affair. It would not be tolerated
in a well run business concern.
It seemed impossible to remedy this situation as long as the courts
had no method of disposing of cases except by trying them. Pre-trial has
created methods to modify this situation to some extent at least.
The Judicial Survey Commission of Massachusetts, created in 1954,
urges the settlement of cases "all along the way and especially before the
case reaches the docket or comes to trial"5 and advocates "a vigorous
effort to make pre-trial do its proper work (p.-99)."
The New York Temporary Commission on the Courts created in
1953 (being the twenty-sixth commission of that sort in that State), in
its current report, 6 notes that 95% of the cases in the State Supreme
(Superior) Court are settled and points out that "an ideal system would
be obtained" if "the entire block of the 95% of settleable cases were
settled at an early state" and trial calendars could consist "only of 5 %
of cases that will necessarily be tried to conclusion." 7 It advocates also
"a preliminary pre-trial settlement conference before they (pending cases)
could be added to the regular trial calendar".'
Speaker Heck of the New York Assembly said, recently, "I believe
the settlement should be implemented * * * an element of compulsion be
introduced" and he urged that "lawyers be persuaded to settle these cases
as early in litigation as is practical without impairing any substantial rights
of litigants."
The 1954 report of the Judicial Council of California' points out
that the settlement approach to litigation is gaining strong advocates
throughout the country. It terms the trial process as "a last resort". 10
5 MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL SURVEY COMMISSION REPORT at 95 (1955).
6 1955 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (February 17, 1955).
7 Id. at 27.
8 lbid.
9 FFTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA TO
THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (December 31, 1954).
1Old at 18.
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Of course, every litigant is entitled to a trial of his case, but there
is a practical side to litigation which may not be ignored; and it seems
reasonably clear that the answer to the problems of our courts is not more
judges or more trials but a wise use of the opportunities which our judges
have to help litigants to end their cases in some other way.
About 1948 some courts, seeming to realize this situation, began
to send cases from their backlogs into conference with a judge with the
avowed purpose of disposing of as many of them as possible without a trial.
Some held general calls of all cases on their dockets, during which
one judge called the calendar and the others held conferences to which
he referred cases for discussion-a process which eliminated deadwood
and ended many of them in the conferences.
In 1949, the New York Supreme (Superior) Court in Kings
County (Brooklyn) and New York County (Manhattan) had a backlog
of some 27,000 cases in these two counties; and it began to send them,
beginning with the oldest, into conference with a judge with the specific
purpose of helping the parties to end them without trial. In the next 6
years, 17,000 of these cases were disposed of by agreement to dispense
with trial or by transfer to a lower court. But there still remain several
thousand untried cases in each of these counties that defy settlement
by agreement, and create a problem for which most courts seem not
to have developed a solution.
This use of conferences to obtain settlements, and the fact that
judges took part in them, met with bitter criticism from lawyers and
judges in New York and elsewhere. But today there is a fairly general
realization that the courts owe citizens more than a forum presided over
by a judge in which to hold legal duels; and the use of settlement methods
is spreading rapidly.
During the early years of pre-trial the conferences were not held until
trial was imminent. That meant that the parties in cases which could be
ended at any time, with the help of a judge, waited for relief, sometimes
for years, because the courts would not give litigants that help, although
it was something to which they were entitled and which the courts for
generations had possessed full power to furnish. Also by permitting these
conditions to continue the courts helped those that were using their facili-
ties, not to obtain a trial, but to postpone meeting their obligations, or to
gain their ends by hold-up methods.
In the last 2 or 3 years, we have seen what may well turn out to be
the most important change in court methods in many a day, i.e., the send-
ing of new cases into conference with a judge almost immediately after
they are at issue. It is due in large measure to our experience with pre-
trial.
The Circuit Court of Michigan in Detroit was one of the first to do
this. Since 1953, its new cases have been sent to conference within a
PRE-TRI4L BY-PRODUCTS
week after issue is joined. This results in the ending of about one-third
of them without trial.
The Supreme Court of New York in New York County now puts
its new cases through conference within a few weeks after issue with
similar results.
In October, 1954, the English Supreme Court made it mandatory
in all civil cases that plaintiffs, within seven days after the pleadings are
closed, take out a summons for a hearing with a judge in which he must
deal with all questions preliminary to the trial, including a possible transfer
to a lower court, as well as all other matters adapted to secure a just, ex-
peditious and economical disposal of the case. Many prompt settlements
are resulting from this procedure."-
In several federal district courts, very soon after a case is at issue,
a judge takes measures to become familiar with it, and to know what
use the parties propose to make of the facilities and privileges of his court.
This has been done by Judge Arthur F. Lederle in the United States
District Court in Detroit for some time.
In the United States District Court in Chicago, it is a regular practice,
as soon as a case is at issue, to set it down for a conference in accordance
with a standing order which provides that "at the time the issues are
joined in each civil case assigned to Judge Campbell the case will be placed
on a pre-trial calendar." Frequently there is a second conference if further
progress can be made on shortening the issue or on settlement. Otherwise,
the case is set for trial.
In the Northern District of Ohio, Judge Frank L. Kloeb calls most
of his civil cases into conference very shortly after they are at issue. Prior
to the conference, counsel must file informal statements of the facts and
references to law and statutes, on which they rely. This, Judge Kloeb says
in a letter to the writer, "enables the court to discuss the case fully on an
equality with counsel." Many settlements result.
This movement for putting new cases through conference soon after
they are at issue means that, for litigants in the cases disposed of in this
way, there will be no law's delay, no depositions, no interrogatories, no
discovery proceedings, no trials, no appeals, no further time lost, no
further expense incurred; something undreamed of a few years ago. These
methods make a strong appeal to the public and they result in large measure
from our experience with pre-trial.
Important as is this new procedure, its possibilities for usefulness, and
indeed those of all pre-trial, are being impaired by litigants (and there are
many of them) who refuse to settle their cases, except on their own terms,
until they are threatened with immediate trial. Such people use the courts,
not to get a trial (from the start they have never intended to try their
case) but to get a better bargain in the settlement with which they plan
1198 SOL. L. J. 598 (1954).
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to end it at the very last moment when they face actual trial. They are
interested in the courts, not as a place where they can try their cases, but
as agencies which they can use to keep alive their cases and perhaps to em-
barrass their opponent as long as there is hope of making a settlement t6
their liking.
Lawyers can hardly be criticized for using such tactics but the courts
can be criticized for allowing conditions to exist which make such tactics
effective.
The inability of the courts to cope with this problem is due largely
to their lack of elasticity in adjusting their facilities to meet emergencies.
This inelasticity is created in part by the almost immovable walls that sur-
round them-walls which seem impossible for them to scale or remove,
such as constitutional provisions and statutes specifying the methods which
they must use.
In recent years the State government in Oregon has attempted to re-
move this inelasticity to some extent by statutes permitting the courts to
use temporary judges and to assign judges from one court to another. One
of.these statutes provides that when the business of the Supreme Court of
the. state is congested or one of the judges is unable to bear his part of the
work of the court, it may designate a Circuit Court judge or judges as
temporary members of the Supreme Court. But in March, 1956 this
statute was declared unconstitutional 2 .
Undoubtedly, there has been and still is a lack of appreciation on the
part of the courts of the extent of their inherent powers to use methods or
means which may facilitate their service to the public, and they hesitate to
use new methods unless they are first authorized by the legislature; al-
though this often is unnecessary. The almost abject surrender by the
courts to the legislatures, over the years, of the powers they rightfully
possess under the separation of powers, may have been good politics but
it may be seriously doubted if it has been for the public interest.
These inherent powers may have never been more important than
today when many courts are overloaded with cases waiting disposition (not
by trial, for only a very few of them will ever be tried), but by methods
other than trial which they must develop if they are to carry their load.
One such method was devised by the Superior Court of Massachusetts
and used for seven years (1935-1942). It was suspended during the
war and was reinstated in 1956. Under it, pending cases are referred
to lawyers selected from lists prepared by the local Bar Associations,
to investigate them and report to the Court. In most instances judgment
is entered on this report following full opportunity to all parties for
objection and amendment. In these seven years, the system was employed
in some 49,000 cases, all of which, except about 1,400, were disposed of
without trial, although the right to a trial was preserved in every instance.
This system has little resemblance to traditional pretrial, but it is an
12 State ex rel Madden v. Crawford, 295 P 2d 174 (Ore. 1956).
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attempt, and a successful one, to dispose of litigation prior to any trial.
This system, discontinued during the war, has now been reinstated. 3
The inherent powers of a court and the basis of the auditor system
were considered by Justice Brandies in his opinion in Ex parte Peterson.
1 4
He said:
Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to
the contrary) inherent powers to provide themselves
with appropriate instruments required for the per-
formance of their dutyY
5
Another significant change is found in the fairly general abandon-
ment of secretiveness with respect to the facts of a case while it is being
prepared for trial and before the evidence is actually presented in court.
Formerly, lawsuits were fought (to use Professor Sunderland's famous
phrase) "from ambush". Now they are fought, for the most part, in
the open.
This change has come about since pre-trial was first used. Undoubted-
ly, this is due to some extent to our experience with pre-trial conferences.
Pre-trial may have changed our concept of the function of our
judges. Perhaps they are to be no longer regarded only as impartial mod-
erators or umpires in courtroom duels; but in addition, as wise, under-
standing friends of those who seek relief in courts, ready to help with their
common sense, wisdom and their knowledge of the law and of human
nature, to adjust differences quickly and with just as little expenditure in
time and money as is possible. Surely this is an end greatly to be desired.
A bill passed in 1956 by the New York legislature may have only
remote relationship, if any, to pre-trial but it may reveal something of the
change of attitude of the public toward trials and the technicalities that
precede them and are involved in them. It provides that "a civil action may
be commenced without the service of a summons or may be continued after
the service of a summons without pleadings by the filing of a statement
signed and acknowledged by all the parties to the action." This indeed
is a far cry from the days of replies, rejoinders, surrejoinders, rebutters,
surrebutters and the like which were a part of the pleading of former years.
Only those familiar with the traditions of the courts can realize how
fundamental the changes we have seen in recent years, and are seeing to-
day, may become. Probably no one knows just what has prompted many
of them. Certainly some of them can be attributed in part at least to our
experience with pre-trial.
For these, and many other reasons, it seems most appropriate that law
students, the lawyers of the future, into whose hands these problems
must soon pass, should publish this symposium and become familiar with
them.
13 Statement by Chief Justice Reardon of Superior Court of Massachusetts,
Boston Herald, Jan. 8, 1956, p. 1.
14253 U. S. 300 (1919).
'5"Id at 312.
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